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Abstract 
This paper looks at randomised assessment of microcredit intervention through Spandana in 
Hyderabad, India. It looks at households with six or more than six members as a restricting 
conditioning to see whether provision of microcredit affects them differently. This paper finds 
significant differences in the way which smaller and bigger families allocate their additional resource 
received in the form of microcredit intervention. As stated above, bigger households spend more on 
durable goods as soon as they received a loan whereas smaller households do not emphasis on 
increasing household stocks. These results are revealing on how different households prioritise their 
expenditure categories and thus may serve as a guide to microcredit institutions on how to provide 
tailored credit packages. Likewise, intuitively bigger households1 had higher borrowing levels 
compared to smaller households2. Furthermore, this paper concludes that smaller households increase 
their borrowing from banks and informal sources as well. The reasons behind this contrast maybe due 
to unconsidered factors in this study such as existing family businesses, household preferences or loan 
provider criteria. 
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1
 The term bigger households refers to households with six or more than six members for the rest of this paper. 
2
 Likewise, the term smaller households refers to households with five or less than five members. 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive number of studies have been carried out on the topic of microfinance 
and microcredit. Social impact researchers have been interested in this area because of its 
potential to develop our understanding of how the poverty is reduced. Grameen Bank pushed 
these concepts and group-lending model to the spotlight. Mohammad Yunus, the founder of 
Grameen Bank was awarded Peace Nobel Prize in 2006, for his “efforts in eradicating 
poverty from below”. Similar developments took place in majority of the developing 
economies around the world such as Banco Sol of Bolivia, BRI of Indonesia and Spandana in 
Hyderabad in India. It attracted many researchers and since then an extensive amount of 
studies have been carried out on how the provision of microloans and microcredit may help 
poorer households. Prior to these developments in the field of microfinance, poor households 
have always had their informal methods of conducting transactions and accessing credit. The 
most common practice among poor households were perhaps borrowing money from a 
relatively richer relatives in the village at a mutually agreed interest rate. The risk of such 
informal practices were that the interest rate would be set at the lender’s discretion. These 
richer households in very informal sense acted as lender institutions to many poor 
households. Their debt recollection methods were harsh and brutal sometimes, in the case 
when poor households didn’t return the loan on time.   
The bedrock for microfinance and microcredit practices have been developing 
countries with some sort of rural communities. Majority of the institutions that tried to 
provide credit to the poor were doomed to failure because of low repayment levels, in other 
words, the running of such institutions were not cost-effective. Thus, default rates were the 
issue of limited liability. Group lending model as a prominent practice in providing credit to 
the poor households, uses social ties and networks to make debt recollection possible 
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(Murdoch, 1999). Since this development in the 1970s, localised variations of the model is 
used around the world to create a feasible credit market for the poor. These institutions are 
involved in a number of activities, which is summarised below: small loans to businesses or 
individuals, collateral substitutes such as group guarantees or compulsory saving accounts. 
These activities are designed to solve the issues of limited liability, adverse selection and so 
on, which will be discussed in the next chapter. If repayments are smooth, access to further 
larger loans and carrying out some sort of assessment on investments or borrowers.  
The major challenge to microfinance institutions (MFIs) since the 1970s, like their 
predecessors, is being financially sustainable. These institutions has two contradictory 
objectives: to reach the poorest families while maintaining financial sustainability. The trade-
off between the two objectives is the challenge for institutions that will end up not having 
enough revenues to cover their costs. At the moment, without the government subsidies these 
institutions will not be able to cover their capital costs. Many researchers such as 
Ledgerwood (1999) and Murdoch (2000) admit that the sheer growth in the size of the 
industry since the start of the millennia however, has been phenomenal. 
This paper provides a critical analysis of how microfinance enables provision of 
microcredit to the poor. In order to do that, it mainly focuses on the group-lending model 
with reference to a few other frameworks. It explores the challenges such as adverse selection 
and moral hazard that formal institutions face when providing a loan to the poor households. 
It further explains how the advent of models such as group-lending has tackled those 
challenges. The paper uses data from a for profit microfinance institution based in India to 
disentangle whether provision of microcredit to poor households raises their welfare. To be 
more specific, this paper will look at randomised results for bigger household sizes with six 
or more than six members. There are two reasons behind this motivation, first, bigger 
households are a common feature of poorer communities, and provision of microcredit 
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mostly takes place in these communities. Second, bigger households may behave differently 
to smaller households, they may vary in their allocation of financial resources on 
consumption or expenditure to that of smaller households. Therefore, it is plausible to 
examine microcredit’s effects conditioned to household size specifically. Welfare is an 
ambiguous concept and one of the main challenges in this paper will be choosing proxy 
variables to study household’s welfare. Section two in this paper reviews existing literature 
on the topic. Section three constitutes the theoretical framework. Section four explains the 
dataset and the methodology, section five is data analysis and presents the results obtained. 
Section six draws conclusions based upon the results and provides some insight into whether 
microfinance is an importance tool to combat poverty or not.  
2. Literature Review 
There has been a sharp growth in the number of microfinance clients, from 7.6 million 
to 137.5 million announced by the Microfinance Summit Campaign in 2012. It has fostered a 
great deal of hope for proponents of the industry who claim it’s the “miracle” to poverty 
alleviation. There are a number definitions for microfinance but the simplest that captures the 
essence is by Schreiner and Colombet (2001); “the attempt to improve access to small 
deposits and small loans for poor households neglected by banks” (p.339). 
Group lending takes much of the discussion when economists try to explain the way 
in which microfinance institutions operate. This is usually a self-selected group of individuals 
who sign the loan contract jointly and take the collective responsibility to repay the debt even 
if a member defaults, this is referred to as joint liability. Initiated by the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh; BankSol of Bolivia, BRI of Indonesia, and majority of other microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) practice a variant of joint liability concept.  
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Group lending is an alternative method to second-best individual lending contracts. It uses 
borrower’s “social assets” (See Berenbach & Guzman, 1994, Murdoch, 1999, and 
Ledgerwood, Earne & Nelson, 2013) to act as collateral. Both group lending and other 
similar models such as a village bank (See Holt, 1994) or Rosca style institutions (See 
Besley, Coate & Loury, 1993) have developed in a situation when people are excluded from 
the formal credit market.  
Generally, the motivation behind Rosca-style institutions is to allow relatives to form 
a group in order to acquire one off lump sum loan (See Harper, 2002). These types of 
institutions are considered inferior to both group lending and credit markets (See Besley et al, 
1993) that is because they do not result in allocative efficiency. Group lending is more 
sophisticated invention in microfinance context; it has enabled the expansion of access to 
credit by lowering transaction costs and mitigating information asymmetries (See Angelucci, 
Karlan & Zinman, 2013, and Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999).  
In order to understand how Grameen-style group lending mitigates information 
asymmetries and lowers cost of borrowing, we ought to discuss the following key concepts. 
2.1 Adverse Selection  
It refers to the problem when banks lack information on how risky their borrowers are 
(See Armendariz & Murdoch, 2010:42). This is considered as an imperfection in the credit 
market because it indirectly signals banks to set interest rates too high. Higher interest rates 
may drive safe borrowers out of the credit market. In order to fill this lack of information 
microfinance presents itself as a solution (See Armendariz & Murdoch, 2010:48). 
2.2 Moral Hazard 
This is the case when banks do not know what borrowers do with the credit (See 
Armendariz & Murdoch, 2010:48). Therefore, banks do not realise if borrowers are 
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hardworking individuals, the type of project they undertake with the fund and so on. Ex-post 
moral hazard refers to the problems that may arise after the disbursement of the loan and 
investments i.e. if the borrowers run away with the loan. As explained by Armanderiz and 
Murdoch (2010) both adverse selection and moral hazard arise from “information 
asymmetries” (p.58) and both of the above issues could be solved if borrowers had a 
collateral. Collaterals are offered to banks or lenders in order to secure a loan. If the borrower 
is unable to repay the borrowed amount, the bank or the lender can seize the collateral in 
order to recoup the amount. This sense of security allows the banks/lenders to issue loans, 
thus, the adverse selection and moral hazard problems are removed. Since poor households 
suffer from limited liability problem i.e. they do not have anything of value to offer as 
collateral, group lending practice makes microfinance appealing and has several advantages. 
It allows “peer selection and monitoring” “assortative matching” “effective price 
discriminating” and “contract enforcement” (See Wenner, 1995 and Murdoch, 1999). 
2.3 More Literature 
Aghion, Armendariz & Gollier (2000) further elucidate that in an adverse selection 
situation it is possible to end up with “inefficiently” high interest rates. Since interest rates are 
the cost of borrowing, this in turn will reduce the opportunities available for poorer economic 
agents (See Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Therefore both adverse selection and absence of 
collateral, pushes the poorer individuals and households out of the credit market and limits 
their access to credit. 
Under group lending/joint liability dynamic incentives begin to form, if the debts are 
paid and a good reputation is built, the path to access further credit becomes smoother, this 
brings efficiency and overcomes the adverse selection problem (See Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990). Ghatak (1999) states, the very fact that borrowers have autonomy to choose their peer 
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results in lower costs of lending to the lender and achieves higher repayment rates. In fact, the 
ability to form a group of people that are willing to be held jointly liable for a loan is a form 
of social capital. Grootaert & Bastelaer (2001) explain two mechanisms through which social 
capital as a microfinance has been developed. Structural social capital which refers to pre-
defined information sharing and decision making through social networks. Cognitive social 
capital which refers to broader norms and beliefs exist within communities which brings 
trust. For instance, Hossain (2013) explains that Grameen Bank model tries to build on social 
capital through improving its relations with its employees, then with its clients and then 
promoting trust between borrowers. He says the three; the bank, its employees and the clients 
are tied in web of trusts and norms, and it is not easy process to become an employee of the 
bank.  
One solution to limited liability problem is the “peer group formation” (See Aghion et 
al, 2000), it reinstates the absence of collateral by imposing the responsibility of repaying the 
debt -if a member defaults- to the rest of the group. Agion et al (2000) defy the notion that 
urban areas have higher rate of mobility and therefore hard to mitigate the moral hazard 
problem. On the other hand, the downsides to a joint liability layout involves weekly 
repayment meetings and puts members under a lot of social pressure but the empirical 
evidence (See Attanasio, Augsburg, De Haas, Fitzsimons & Harmgart, 2014) suggest that it’s 
doing a better job than the alternatives such as individual lending, in all levels.  
Murdoch (1999) questioned the rhetoric of poverty alleviation through microfinance 
and stated that it has moved far ahead of empirical evidence. Although, the old perception 
that the poor do not have the capacity to save was questioned by Aportela (1999) too, where, 
he used data from Mexican National Survey of Income and Expenditure and showed that 
providing financial services to low-income households increased their saving rates by more 
than 5% point. However, until recent years not many empirical studies were conducted to 
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identify the impact of availability of microcredit to low-income households. From statistical 
difficulties in measuring household’s utilities to lack of credible data in order to carry out 
inferences from, there were a wide range of paucities in this field.  
The next set of papers that will be discussed show a causal link between group-
lending practice by microfinance institutions, which made microcredit available and 
reduction in levels of poverty. These experiments were randomised, contained controlled and 
treatment groups.    
Upon availability of microcredit, De Mel McKenzie & Woodruff (2008) showed that 
the average real return to capital for enterprises went up by 5% per month (55% per year). 
They found that both household’s wealth and entrepreneurial ability had a positive impact on 
their results. Similarly, Karlan and Zinman (2010) found that microcredit borrowers benefited 
significantly from the credit that was made available by a microfinance institution for profit 
in a semi-competitive market in South Africa. Karlan & Zinman (2010) findings showed that 
making access to credit easier improved all outcomes (i.e. increased borrowed, higher 
income, employed, etc…) on average. But the caveat with this conclusion is that certain 
advantages or disadvantages may take longer to appear. De Mel et al’s (2009) findings were 
based on a data that suffered from small sample size estimations and limited data availability. 
Whereas Karlan & Zinman’s (2010) found it difficult to establish the counterfactual 
argument. Any attempt to measure the impact of credit availability on households (self-
employed or otherwise) is complicated with an identification issue i.e. it becomes difficult to 
single out the effect of the loan that was made available to an individual or a group of self-
selected borrowers.  
Karlan and Zinman (2010) argued that revealed preferences dictate, making credit 
access easier allows marginally secluded borrowers to benefit whereas behavioural economic 
models say the opposite. Behaviourist’s state that individual’s preferences and cognitions 
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vary therefore, it may lead to over borrowing (See Angelucci et al, 2013). Karlan and Zinman 
(2010) argued that their findings from the South African market “casts doubt” on the “over 
borrowing” presumption that behavioural models suggest about vulnerable consumers. In a 
separate paper, Karlan and Zinman (2011) also tested for the effects of individual lending 
through credit scoring and they found that net borrowing increased in the treatment group but 
individuals wellbeing declined mainly due to business stress. In a similar fashion, Attanasio 
et al’s (2014) experiment in rural Mongolia indicated no significant increase in consumption 
or entrepreneurship for individual loans. Both papers stated that they found no significant 
support for individual loans in the above contexts to show that it helps poor recipients.  
However, when Attanasio et al (2014) compared the differential in the impact of 
group lending and individual lending; they found a positive correlation between group loans, 
and consumption and entrepreneurship. Attanasio (2014) also provided further evidence that 
households with a microenterprise who were offered a group loan realized an increase of 10 
percent or more profits. This highlights the supporting evidence that under the joint liability 
practice borrowers are more likely to spend their loans on investment ventures, thus realizing 
higher rates of return. On the contrary, under individual loans, borrowers do not have the 
same incentive.  
Both Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2013) and Crépon, Devoto, Duflo & 
Parienté (2014) carried out randomised evaluation when microcredit was made available to 
two different places. Both papers agreed that microcredit and group lending practices are 
powerful financial instruments for the poor; however they are not the “miracle” to alleviate 
them out of poverty. Banerjee et al (2013) in villages “Bastis” of Hyderabad, India looked at 
the following variables: number of new businesses started after the provision of the loan, 
household’s consumption levels, business income as well as education, health and women’s 
empowerment. These indicators were picked in order to determine whether the microloan had 
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an impact on each one of them, hence providing information on whether these households 
were made better off. They found no influence on monthly consumption of the households, 
no or little impact on education, health or women’s empowerment. However the findings of 
Banerjee et al’s (2013) study indicated that the loans had stimulated a number of other things 
such as labour supply choices in the household, i.e. people working harder and longer hours 
on their own businesses. And it had changed the household’s enter-temporal choices, 
accounting for heterogeneity in this study. Crépon et al’s (2014) paper estimated the impact 
of taking a microloan in Morocco. They showed that the increase in self-employment 
activities and assets were offset by a sharp reduction in income from casual labour. The 
above two studies argued that microcredit may work through different channels but they do 
not move poor households out of poverty, at least in the short term.  
The following two papers looked at the impact of availability of microcredit from 
different angles. Kaboski and Townsend (2011) using a structural study found that 
households increased both their borrowing and consumption levels almost equivalent to the 
value of credit expansion. However, in their conclusion, they argued that due to high interest 
rate costs being carried to the future, household’s utilities are “saddled” and the increase in 
borrowing is not sufficient proxy for economic welfare. For 10% higher than the market rate, 
Angelucci et al (2013) studied the effect of group lending at 110% annual payment rate 
(APR) to crisscross the average effect of the loan on a set of broad outcomes such as credit 
access, creditworthiness, use of grants for business and so on. Their finding stated that 
microcredit loan is generally beneficial for poor households but it is not as transformative as 
advertised by the practitioners.  
13 
 
2.4 Literature Review Conclusion 
Poor households do not have collateral to protect them against the credit that they 
would like to access through standard means; therefore, they are excluded from the credit 
market. Banks and credit agencies argue that problems such as limited liability, moral hazard 
and adverse selection doesn’t allow them to make credit accessible to this segment of the 
market. The advent of microfinance practices namely group lending which gave rise to the 
idea of joint liability has provided a theoretical solution to difficulties mentioned above. 
Group lending in theory allows formation of a group that has full information about 
each other, they vouch to pay the debt even if a member defaults and they monitor each 
other’s activities. However, evidence from randomised experiments carried out on several 
microfinance institutions provide mixed results. As discussed, one set of papers showed that 
there was a positive link between group lending and outcome variables such as higher 
income, higher rates of returns, better entrepreneurship etc…. A further set of papers argued 
otherwise and concluded that the changes in the above variables may not necessarily translate 
into economic welfare. The papers showed very little or no evidence to support for individual 
microloans and reduction in poverty levels. There is no straightforward answer and many 
findings of the empirical experiments are local and contextual. However, from the number of 
randomised literature that has been reviewed here in this paper, Karlan and Zinman’s (2010) 
findings in a semi-competitive market in South Africa more convincing. They showed that 
microcredit provision resulted in higher incomes, more borrowing, and more time being 
employed.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
Frameworks that explain microfinance intervention have one key assumption in 
common; that the provision of microfinance to a household will change the behaviour and 
practice of the household, it therefore results in a ‘modified outcome for the agent’ (Hulme, 
2000). He further argues that there are three paradigms of impact assessment; scientific 
methods, humanities tradition and participatory learning and action (PLA) methods. A 
common approach in scientific method is Randomised Controlled Trials (RCT). RCT looks at 
before and after in treatment areas and control areas. It uses a diff-in-diff set up to attribute 
causal effects.  This type of study may lead to sample bias and misspecification. Details of 
this approach is discussed in Hulme and Mosely (1996). Participatory Learning Action (PLA) 
on the other hand contradicts scientific methods on impact assessment studies. Chambers 
(1997) argued that scientific methods fail to capture the ‘complexity, diversity and 
contingency’ of livelihood and it reduces it down to just ‘unidirectional chains’ of 
relationships.  
3.1 Households Economic Portfolio  
Community, enterprises, individuals and households were the four key categories that 
Sebstad et al (1995) proposed in order to assess the impact of the provision of microcredit 
schemes. Although, their paper wasn’t published or peer reviewed but this framework has 
been extended further since then. Cohen et al (1996) developed a Households Economic 
Portfolio (HEP) analysis of Sebstad et al’s framework. Therefore, HEP analysis may serve as 
a theoretical framework for this paper. The agents are households that have been provided the 
opportunity to borrow from a provider, in this case Spandana. The outcome variables that 
could be studied for households, Sebstad et al (1995) pointed out are income levels, 
expenditures and household assets (durable goods). Cohen et al (1996) explained that credit 
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has a role in bringing changes to a Household’s Economic Portfolio (HEP) structure, 
depending on which part of the portfolio this credit is allocated. The provision of credit 
creates more financial resources for the household at present time in order to spend on 
activities. Cohen et al (1996) suggest a number of possible hypothesis, three of which are 
relevant to this paper:  
H-3: Participation in microenterprise services leads to an increase in 
the reliance of the Household on high-return production activities. 
H-4: Participation in microenterprise services leads to an increase in 
key physical assets. 
H-6: Pa9rticipation in microenterprise services leads to an increase in 
expenditures on the education and training of household members. 
HEP incorporates a circular flow model that includes the following elements; 
households use physical, financial and human resources to consume, invest and produce 
more. Cohen et al (1996) using HEP model explain that microfinance intervention brings 
additional financial resources for the households to use. Household Economic Portfolio 
(HEP) has its limitations too in explaining microfinance intervention, for instance do not 
explain the impact of the external factors on households (AIMS, 2001).   
Based on this conceptual framework, this paper will use households as the main 
agents that have received the microfinance intervention in the treatment areas. Using the 
hypothesis suggested by Cohen et al (1996), it will test whether a number of outcome 
variables (target variables listed in methodology section) change when it is made easy to 
access credit in the treatment areas. Bigger households are comprised of a minimum of 6 
members and a maximum of 26 members. Household size is a key characteristic in studying 
the poorer households and therefore, it is important to know how access to microcredit is 
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affected when household size changes. The average household size in the prominent study 
carried out by Banerjee et al (2014) was five members. The suggested hypothesis in this 
paper is the following: with variations in the number of households, the family’s inter-
temporal choices change on how much to consume and to borrow. So, we expect higher rates 
of borrowing and consumption for households with six or more than six members in the 
treatment compared to control areas.  
4. Empirical Approach 
This paper carries out an empirical research to look at the effect of microfinance on 
families of different size. This is a randomised control trial (RCT) study, so therefore, it will 
be looking at change of pattern across a number of variables in control versus treatment 
effects in the sample.  
4.1 Methodology 
This paper looks at the treated-control areas for each of these households and assess a 
number of components of the household’s portfolio that may have changed over time. For 
instance, to look for consumption of the household, it will look total expenditure per capita, 
expenditure per capita on durable goods, non- durable goods, food, health, education, 
temptation goods and festivals. This paper employs an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) layout 
with a regression that looks like this:  
yic = β0 + β1X1c+ β2 X2c + β4 X3c + β5 X5c + βk Xkc… + uic  
β1 is the intent-to-treat effect, treat is the indicator that households living in the treated area. 
Xic’s are the causal factors of interest. Xkc are a number of control variables from baseline 
data at based at the household level. The control variables include area population, total 
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outstanding debt in the area, and total number of businesses in the area, mean of monthly per-
capita expenditure in the area, area literacy rate per area and literacy rate calculated as per 
head of the households. All the standards errors are clustered at the area level using the 
specific area ID assigned to them. 
4.2 Households Size Bigger than Six 
My actual regression equation that have been used to obtain results is the following:  
yci = β0 + β1treatc + β2 hhbigci + β3 treatc * hhbigci + βkXk  + hhbigci + uit  
Where c indicates the community, i indicates the household, yci is the outcome of interest for 
household i in community c, treatc is an indicator variable equal to 1, if the community is 
treated, 0, if the community is control. hhbigci is an indicator equal to 1, if household i in 
community c has six or more members. This will capture the intent-to-treat effect conditioned 
to household size. Using this layout, it will allow me to see how outcomes vary with 
household size condition. In a randomised control trial the cornerstone is to carry out an 
intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis. This approach includes all those in the treatment area and tests 
the treatment policy. What this means in the context of microfinance is that by carrying out 
an ITT analysis, it will test whether the policy of easing access to microcredit in the treatment 
area led to significant differences to that of the comparison area. There are a number of other 
methods that are also used when investigating the effect of an intervention in a randomised 
control trial (RCT) context. The longitudinal analysis of changes, analysis of covariance and 
autoregression (Twisk et al, 2008). 
4.3 Spill over Effects 
yci = β0 + β1treatc + β2 hhbigci + β3 treatc * hhbigci + βkXk  + hhbigci + uit  
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In the model above, yci does not depend on treatc of a different group. This means spill over 
effects are excluded. However, when evaluating there is an assumption to be discussed. Chen 
et al (2009) explains how the stable unit treatment value is violated because terms 
implemented in the control groups are often influenced by the terms implemented in the 
treatment areas. Since we looking at all the control and treatment areas, there is no distinction 
and all subjects receive same treatment this violation is avoided. No discrimination is made 
against those who live in the treatment areas when allowing them to access credit, the same 
eligibility criteria is applied to all residents in the area.  
In using this methodology, this paper will contribute to the current literature and 
methodology built by Banerjee et al (2014) into the role of provision of microcredit and 
microloan to poor households. Conditioning the effect of this provision on the household 
size, allows new insights into how the recipients of the microcredit behave. It also provides 
whether household size plays a significant role in alleviating the recipient’s household’s 
financial status. 
4.4 Background 
The experiment was carried out by Spandana and Institute for Financial Management 
Research (IFMR) in Chennai. It contains information about 120 slums in Hyderabad, Andhra 
Pradesh, India’s fifth largest city in 2005. This data is composed of changes in the loans, 
amounts borrowed and expenditure to measure consumption. The household samples 
randomly selected were conditioned to have a female member aged 18 to 55. Originally it is a 
large dataset, some of which aren’t relevant to my topic question, have not been used. For 
instance variables such as education levels and social empowerment of women in the society 
have been omitted from my data analysis. In order to see how the data was collected and the 
randomization of an unbiased sample was insured see Banerjee et al (2014).   
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4.4 Data 
The baseline survey was carried out by Spandana, a large for profit microfinance 
institution in 2005, when there were no microfinance institution’s (MFI) operating in these 
slums. The survey was mainly aimed at finding areas with high population of potential clients 
(borrowers). This includes the Baseline data (2005) collected from 2800 households. The 
principles were to look for poor people who had resided in the area for the last three years 
and areas with less population of construction workers. In India, construction workers travel 
with their work placement, in other words, they finish a construction project, they settle in a 
different area for a different project. Spandana management selected 120 areas with enough 
potential borrowers that would have been eligible for opening branches. They further dropped 
16 more areas due to higher density of construction workers in these areas. In order ensure 
randomisation is unbiased, it happens after these areas are dropped out of the sample. They 
only opened branches in 52 slums, this was the treatment areas, whereas the other 52 slums 
remained with no branches, this acted as the control group. The 52 areas that had Spandana 
branches opened, had access to microloans and microcredit.  
Endline 1 (2007/8) and Endline 2 (2009/10), data was collected from all the 104 
slums at the household level with 6864 observations, this was after Spandana and other 
MFI’s had launched operations. The data was collected from 52 groups for treatment and 
another 52 for control areas, where access to credit wasn’t easy. Same households weren’t 
resurveyed for Baseline and Endline 1 and Endline 2. However, exactly same households 
were resurveyed for Endline 1 and Endline 2 with the same sample frame. The same criteria 
was observed when selecting the households for Endline 1 and Endline 2. The re-contact rate 
was higher than 90% for Endline 1 and Endline 2 surveys. Each household must have resided 
in the area for the last three years and is rated by Spandana as eligible-borrower.  In addition 
to that the Endline 1 and Endline 2 data were collected in at least 12 months or more intervals 
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after the Spandana branches opened in the treatment areas. Extra precaution were in place 
such as double-entry and cross-checking the data once it was computerized.  
5. Data Analysis 
5.1 Outcome variables 
Table A, below, provides a statistical summary for the first set of outcome variables 
that we are interested in Endline 1 and Endline 2. It shows the household expenditure per 
capita on a number of categories such as durable goods, festivals and etc…. The table 
includes the number of observations, mean values and standard deviations for each of those 
variables.    
Table A: Summary Statistics 
 
   
  
  
 
Endline 1 Endline 2 
Expenditure per capita Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. 
Total expenditure monthly 6827 1436.838 1106.431   6142 1899.613 1296.055 
Durable expenditure  
per capita monthly 6781 127.893 418.081   6140 156.795 334.724 
Non-durable expenditure  
per capita monthly 6781 1312.013 963.282   6142 1741.085 1159.905 
Food expenditure  
per capita monthly 6827 520.278 277.180   6142 813.912 524.023 
Health expenditure  
per capita monthly 6827 138.563 407.186   6141 211.007 559.970 
Education expenditure per  
capita monthly 5415 170.061 254.279   4910 255.861 387.218 
Temptation goods expenditure  
per capita monthly 6827 79.724 128.244   6142 112.248 178.596 
Festivals expenditure  
per capita monthly 6827 65.220 109.263   6103 111.494 135.427 
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5.2 Has an Outstanding Loan 
Table B, below, looks at indebtedness of households at Baseline, Endline 1 and 
Endline 2. At baseline (68%) of households already had an unpaid loan, of which a majority 
of (63%) were from informal loans. Borrowing from Spandana, non-Spandana MFIs and 
Banks were (0.51%), (1.52%) and (4.06%) respectively. Two years later at Endline 1 
(2007/08), borrowing from informal sources increased to (73.37%), borrowing from 
Spandana, non-Spandana MFIs and banks also increased to (13.18%), (14.23%) and (8.16%) 
respectively. At the time of Endline 2 (2009/10) borrowing had changed in the following 
order: Spandana (15.14%), non-spandana MFIs (25.33%), banks (7.38%), informal loans 
(60.32%). The total loan amount for households at Endline 2 had increased only by 5%, when 
compared to Endline 1. We can only compare the patterns for Endline 1 and Endline 2 
because the data was collected from the same sample frame. Even then, we cannot prompt 
from these changes that easing access to microcredit had helped households out of poverty. 
These descriptions just looks at how certain outcome values have changed over time.  
 
 
 
Table B: Has an Outstanding Loan 
Obs Baseline %   Obs Endline 1 
  
Obs Endline 2 
  
  Yes No     Yes No 
  
  Yes No 
# Outstanding loan  
to Spandana 2789 0.29% 99.71%   6811 13.18% 86.82%   6142 15.14% 84.86% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Other MFIs 2789 1.33% 98.67%   6657 14.23% 85.77%   6142 25.33% 74.67% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Banks 2789 3.87% 96.13%   6811 8.16% 91.84%   6142 7.38% 92.62% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Informally 2789 62.78% 37.22%   6811 73.37% 26.63%   6142 60.32% 39.68% 
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# Outstanding loan  
to Any loan 2789 67.62% 32.38%   6862 85.76% 14.24%   6142 90.52% 9.48% 
 
Table C, Panel 1, looks at households with six or more than six members in their 
family at Baseline, Endline 1 and Endline 2. It looks at the same variables in Table B, but for 
bigger households only. These households at Baseline acquire (0.55%) to Spandana, (1.89%) 
to non-Spandana, (4.33%) to banks and (66.70%) through informal loans. However, at 
Endline 1, that is two years later; loans to Spandana (14.79%), non-Spandana (16.04%), 
banks (9.27%), informal loans (76.15%) increased. Furthermore, at Endline 2, we can see 
some noticeable changes in those percentages; Spandana (16.94%), non-Spandana (27.65%), 
Banks (8.12%) and informal loans (61.35%). There is only 3% increase in acquiring a loan at 
Endline 2 for the total number of households with six or more members when compared to 
Endline 1. Table C, Panel 2, looks at households with five or less than five members in their 
family at Baseline, Endline 1 and Endline 2. It looks at the same variables in Table B, but for 
smaller households only. These households at Baseline acquire credits of (0.16%) to 
Spandana, (1.06%) to non-Spandana, (3.65%) to banks and (60.91%) through informal loans. 
However, at Endline 1, that is two years later; loans to Spandana (11.93%), non-Spandana 
(12.82%), banks (7.3%), informal loans (71.19%), increased. Furthermore, at Endline 2, we 
can see some noticeable changes in those percentages; Spandana (13.73%), non-Spandana 
(31.09%), Banks (6.60%) and informal loans (61.35%). There is 5% increase in acquiring a 
loan at Endline 2 for the total number of households with five or less than five members 
when compared to Endline 1.  
The percentages for household size with six or more members are higher for all the 
variables listed in Table C at Endline 2 when compared to Endline 1 and Baseline. It suggests 
that these households borrow more and consume more when credit is made available to them. 
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The 3% increase in total value for households with six or more members compare to 5% for 
smaller households is due to bigger household’s acquiring more debts in Endline 1.   
Furthermore, the percentages for informal loans show that provision of microcredit by 
Spandana and non-Spandana MFIs did not act as substitute for the informal loans across all 
three periods. Informal loans are loans received from relatives, money lenders, any source 
that wasn’t considered a bank or microfinance institution.   
Table C: Has an Outstanding Loan 
Household size≥6 Obs Baseline % 
 
Obs Endline 1 Obs Endline 2 
Credit   Yes No     Yes No 
  
  Yes No 
# Outstanding loan  
to Spandana 901 0.55% 99.45%   2989 14.79% 85.21%   2709 16.94% 83.06% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Other MFIs 901 1.89% 98.11%   2912 16.04% 83.96%   2709 27.65% 72.35% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Banks 901 4.33% 95.67%   2989 9.27% 90.73%   2709 8.12% 91.88% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Informally 901 66.70% 33.30%   2989 76.15% 23.85%   2709 61.35% 38.65% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Any loan 
901 71.48 28.52%   3011 87.51% 12.49%   2709 90.88% 9.12% 
 
     
 
Household size≤5 Obs Baseline % 
 
Obs Endline 1 Obs Endline 2 
Credit   Yes No     Yes No 
  
  Yes No 
# Outstanding loan  
to Spandana 1888 0.16% 99.84%   3822 11.93% 88.07%   2818 13.73% 86.27% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Other MFIs 1888 1.06% 98.94%   3745 12.82% 87.18%   2818 31.09% 68.91% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Banks 1888 3.65% 96.35%   3822 7.30% 92.70%   2818 6.60% 93.40% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Informally 
1888 60.91% 39.09%   3822 71.19% 28.81%   2818 57.88% 42.12% 
# Outstanding loan  
to Any loan 
1888 65.78% 34.22%   3851 84.39% 15.61%   2818 89.39% 10.61% 
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6. Results 
The results presented here, are obtained using the regression outlined above in the 
methodology section. This paper has looked at two outcome variables at the household level; 
expenditure per capita and credit (outstanding loan amount). Furthermore, it looks for treat 
effects for both small and big households, then specifically for both bigger and smaller 
households on their own. All the standard deviations presented in parenthesis are clustered at 
the area level. * means significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.  
6.1 Expenditure 
Table 1 shows the intent-to-treat estimates of the household expenditure per capita. 
These are the result of the models described earlier in the methodology section with a number 
of control variables from the baseline. These control variables were: area population, total 
outstanding debt in each area, total number of businesses in each area, area mean monthly per 
capita expenditure, area literacy rate calculated as per household’s heads only and area 
literacy rate. At Endline 1, rows 2, 7 and 8 shows that there are shifts in the consumption 
patterns on durable goods, temptation good and festivals in the treatment areas. These 
changes are significant at 10% significance test level. There is a significant increase in the 
number of durable goods that households bought in the period which they had access to 
microcredit. Temptation goods are the list of goods that households at the first survey stated 
that they would like to spend less money on them. The intent-to-treat effect coefficient shows 
that expenditure on both temptation goods and festivals decreased.   
At Endline 2, when both comparison areas and treatment areas had access to 
microcredit, column 8 shows an increase in expenditure on festivals, which is the only 
significant change. Expenditure on temptation goods still remains negative but insignificant. 
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Total expenditure, and expenditure on durables and non-durables aren’t significantly different 
between the treatment and comparison areas. Rows 4, 5 and 6 shows that the intent-to-treat 
expenditure coefficient on food, health and education that are negative and insignificant for 
both periods Endline 1 and Endline 2.     
 
6.2 Expenditure; Household with six or More than six Members 
Table 2a has two panels first for Endline 1 and second for Endlin 2. It gives the intent-
to-treat effects of the monthly per capita expenditure on households with six or more than six 
members (Household Size≥6) for a number of categories. We are interested in treat*hhbig 
Observations
1 Total
10.78175
(35.90)
0.765 6801
2 Durables
21.313*
(11.41)
0.065 6755
3 Non-Durables
-7.811
(173.25)
0.800 6755
4 Food
-13.02975
(11.63)
0.265 6801
5 Health
-3.72584
(11.46)
0.746 6801
6 Education
-1.3689
(9.34)
0.884 5397
7 Temptation
-9.084*
(4.96)
0.071 6801
8 Festivals
-13.80*
(8.20)
0.096 6801
Observations
1 Total
42.2833
(49.80)
0.398 6118
2 Durables
1.5475
(9.74)
0.874 6116
3 Non-Durables
-39.9887
(45.65)
0.383 6118
4 Food
-12.93847
(21.32)
0.545 6118
5 Health
-20.83371
(17.11)
0.226 6117
6 Education
12.13831
(13.74)
0.379 4890
7 Temptation
-10.43391
(6.70)
0.122 6118
8 Festivals
6.89*
(4.06)
0.093 6080
Endline 1
Endline 2
treatment & p-values
Table 1: Expenditure per month per capita  (with Baseline Controls)
treatment & p-values
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discussion; this indicates whether bigger households are different when in the treatment 
areas.  
Endline 1, rows 1, 3, 6 and 8 show that total monthly expenditure and spending on 
non-durable goods, education and festivals have decreased. Spending on durable goods, food, 
health and temptation goods have increased. However, all of these results are statistically not 
significant.  
Endline 2 this is two years later, rows 2, 6, 7 and 8 indicate that spending on durable 
goods, education, temptation goods and festivals decreased. On the other hand, total spending 
increased, spending on non-durable goods, food and health also increased. However, all of 
these results are statistically not significant.   
For bigger households (hhbig) discussion on its own, rows 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 shows 
significant changes at 1% and 5% significance level: Total monthly expenditure is reduced, 
spending on non-durable goods, food and festivals have also reduced. There is an increase on 
monthly spending on durable goods but statistically insignificant.  
Furthermore, at Endline 2 for hhbig discussion, in addition to all the significant 
changes listed in Endline 1, row 2 suggests that there is a significant increase in expenditure 
patterns on durable goods. Column 5 suggest that there is a significant reduction in monthly 
expenditure on health. This means that increased expenditure on durable goods is balanced by 
the reduction on spending in health and temptation goods.  
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Table 2a: Expenditure per month per capita Household size≥6 (with Baseline Controls) 
Endline 1 
treatment       p-values hhbig           p-values treat*hhbig    p-values No. Obs 
1 Total 16.114 (66.127) 0.808 
-310.719*** 
(34.684) 0.000 
-5.936 
(66.920) 0.929 6801 
2 Durables 47.694 (56.342) 0.399 
90.065 
(62.742) 0.154 
83.988 
(85.452) 0.328 6755 
3 Non-Durables 
-1.134 
(59.453) 0.985 
-293.999*** 
(28.836) 0.000 
-7.532 
(59.206) 0.899 6755 
4 Food -21.099 (16.334) 0.199 
-144.249*** 
(8.824) 0.000 
12.515 
(15.439) 0.419 6801 
5 Health -12.252 (21.666) 0.573 
-27.012 
(18.893) 0.156 
12.503 
(22.697) 0.583 6801 
6 Education 6.464 (12.511) 0.607 
-5.8578 
(9.182) 0.525 
-10.371 
(13.446) 0.442 5397 
7 Temptation -12.865 (8.760) 0.145 
-30.666*** 
(5.765) 0.000 
5.652 
(8.765) 0.520 6801 
8 Festivals -13.286 (9.582) 0.169 
-16.294** 
(5.157) 0.002 
-0.642 
(6.406) 0.920 6801 
Endline 2 
treatment   p-values hhbig      p-values treat*hhbig   p-values No. Obs 
1 Total -66.713 (81.244) 0.413 
-351.284*** 
(60.639) 0.000 
36.959 
(83.065) 0.657 6118 
2 Durables 58.366 (71.662) 0.417 
134.753** 
(60.435) 0.028 
-64.741 
(86.230) 0.454 6118 
3 Non-Durables 
-63.93 
(72.917) 0.383 
-309.712*** 
(2.161) 0.000 
36.058 
(72.309) 0.619 6118 
4 Food -32.332 (26.066) 0.364 
-158.834*** 
(26.066) 0.000 
28.775 
(35.552) 0.420 6118 
5 Health -20.802 (35.451) 0.559 
-77.052** 
(29.873) 0.011 
0.325 
(36.671) 0.993 6117 
6 Education 15.798 (22.541) 0.485 
-10.48147 
(14.413) 0.469 
-4.966 
(22.455) 0.825 4890 
7 Temptation -7.009 (10.569) 0.509 
-18.771** 
(6.377) 0.004 
-4.861 
(11.023) 0.660 6118 
8 Festivals 17.634** (7.561) 0.022 
-10.631** 
(4.311) 0.015 
-15.475 
(8.381) 0.068 6080 
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6.3 Expenditure; Household with Five or less than Five Members 
Table 2b is also constitutes two panels first for Endline 1 and second for Endline 2. It 
gives the intent-to-treat effects of the monthly per capita expenditure on households with five 
or less than five members (Household Size≤5) for a number of categories. As before, we are 
interested in treat*hhsmall discussion for Endline 1, this indicates whether smaller 
households are different when in the treatment areas.  
Endline 1, rows 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 show that spending on durable goods, food, health, 
education and temptation goods have decreased. Total expenditure and spending on non-
durable goods and festivals have increased. However, all of these results are statistically not 
significant.  
Endline 2 this is two years later, row 8 shows the only significant increase in spending 
is on festivals. Rows 2, 4, 6 and 7 indicate that spending on durable goods, food, education 
and temptation goods have decreased. On the other hand, total spending increased, spending 
on non-durable goods and health also increased. However, all of these results are statistically 
not significant.   
For smaller households (hhsmall) discussion on its own, all the outcomes increased 
and all of them are statistically significant except spending on durable goods. Furthermore, at 
Endline 2 for hhsmall discussion all of the outcomes have increased and they are statistically 
significant except the increased spending on festivals. However, spending on durable goods 
have decreased. The reason behind this decrease maybe the fact that spending on durable 
goods increased at Endline 1, and since these items remain with the households, they didn’t 
need to spend as much on durable goods anymore.  
Table 2b: Expenditure per month per capita Household size≤5 (with Baseline Controls) 
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Endline 1 
treatment    p-values hhsmall      p-values treat*hhsmall   p-values Obs. 
1 Total 10.396 (39.469) 0.793 
327.542*** 
(35.452) 0.000 
5.202 
(58.171) 0.929 6801 
2 Durables 188.563** (93.853) 0.047 
3.252 
(75.377) 0.966 
-148.274 
(100.853) 0.145 6755 
3 Non-
Durables 
-15.326 
(31.67) 0.629 
287.092*** 
(30.085) 0.000 
17.756 
(48.154) 0.713 6755 
4 Food -6.712 (13.260) 0.614 
121.960*** 
(13.757) 0.000 
-9.694 
(13.757) 0.483 6801 
5 Health 0.895 (13.586) 0.948 
27.044** 
(15.641) 0.087 
-7.946 
(20.303) 0.696 6801 
6 Education 1.287 (10.893) 0.906 
41.516*** 
(8.827) 0.000 
-4.008 
(11.752) 0.734 5397 
7 Temptation -4.649 (5.013) 0.356 
30.019*** 
(5.256) 0.000 
-7.571 
(6.621) 0.255 6801 
8 Festivals -14.145* (8.246) 0.089 
13.591** 
(4.876) 0.006 
0.818 
(5.961) 0.891 6801 
Endline 2 
treatment       p-
values hhsmall      p-values treat*hhsmall   p-values Obs. 
1 Total -44.877 (51.773) 0.388 
325.015*** 
(46.583) 0.000 
10.046 
(59.389) 0.866 6118 
2 Durables 34.829 (63.589) 0.585 
-61.589 
(60.997) 0.315 
-38.787 
(76.959) 0.615 6116 
3 Non-
Durables 
-50.562 
(46.771) 0.282 
278.793*** 
(39.981) 0.000 
23.750 
(50.868) 0.642 6118 
4 Food -3.184 (22.518) 0.888 
136.375*** 
(15.592) 0.000 
-15.434 
(22.894) 0.502 6118 
5 Health -37.633* (25.436) 0.052 
44.072* 
(25.436) 0.086 
31.180 
(28.964) 0.284 6117 
6 Education 17.743 (1.10) 0.272 
31.971** 
(13.756) 0.022 
-10.025 
(18.851) 0.596 4890 
7 Temptation -9.729 (7.165) 0.178 
22.794*** 
(6.322) 0.000 
-0.903 
(8.822) 0.919 6118 
8 Festivals -3.490 (5.190) 0.503 
6.715 
(5.426) 0.219 
18.896** 
(6.724) 0.006 6080 
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6.4 Access to Credit 
Table 3, rows 1, 4, 5 and 6 intent to treat coefficients show a significant change in 
access to credit to the households at Endline 1. This is the period that only Spandana had 
launched operating at the treatment areas. Access to Spandana credit is significantly positive. 
The reduction in access to credit through informal sources is also statistically significant. 
Column 5 shows that the number of late repayments were negative and statistically 
significant in this period, i.e. a lot of people could not repay their first credit uptake on time. 
Column 6 shows that there were positive number of cycles that people borrowed when the 
access to microcredit was made easier. Even though the late repayments may be seen as a 
sign that people won’t desire to borrow as they could not repay on time, but the ease provided 
for the treatment areas encouraged borrowing. Furthermore, this also shows in the reduced 
percentage of borrowing from informal sources. At Endline 2, when all other MFIs had 
started operating at treatment and comparison areas, the only positive significant shifts 
observed from the intent-to-treat effect is borrowing from Spandana and number of cycles 
that people borrowed. Borrowing from other MFIs were negative but statistically 
insignificant. 
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6.5 Credit; Households with six or More than six Members 
Table 4a, is constructed of two panels; Endline 1 and Endline 2. It gives the intent-to-
treat effects of easing access to credit conditioned to household size with six or more than six 
members. The access to credit is easy from Spandana in the treated areas. We are interested 
in treat*hhbig discussion for Endline 1 here, this indicates whether bigger households are 
different when in the treatment areas. Row 6 shows that there is a reduction in the number of 
cycles borrowed at Endline 1 but this is not statistically significant. Borrowing from 
Observations
1 Spanda
0.162***
(0.022)
0.000 6783
2 Other MFI
-0.006
(0.024)
0.803 6630
3 Other Bank
0.004
(0.012)
0.728 6783
4 Informal
-0.051**
(0.021)
0.016 6783
5
Ever late 
payment?
-0.058**
(0.026)
0.029 6448
6
Number of 
cycles
 borrowed
0.111**
(0.041)
0.008 6788
Observations
1 Spanda
0.080***
(0.021)
0.000 6118
2 Other MFI
-0.292
(0.269)
0.278 6118
3 Other Bank
0.00026
(0.0085)
0.976 6118
4 Informal
0.00425
(0.0174)
0.808 6118
5
Ever late 
payment?
0.00921
(0.021)
0.662 6118
6
Number of 
cycles
 borrowed
0.135*
(0.068)
0.049 5903
Table 3 : Access to Credit  (with Baseline Controls)
Endline 1
treatment & p-values
Endline 2
treatment & p-values
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Spandana, Other MFI and so on have increased yet all of the increments are statistically 
insignificant.  
At Endline 2, rows 1, 4, 5 and 6 shows that there are statistically insignificant 
reductions in borrowing from Spandana and informal sources. There is also indications of late 
repayments and less borrowing cycles but they are also statistically insignificant. However, 
borrowing from other MFIs and Banks have increased at this period. If we recall, at Endline 
2, other MFIs had launched their operations alongside Spandana and given the opportunity 
banks may have also eased their credit issue criteria. This can explain the reduction in 
borrowing from Spandana.  
For hhbig discussion on its own, accessing credit from Spandana, other MFIs, 
informal, late payments and number of cycles borrowed have increased and they are 
statistically significant. All these shifts are positive and indicates that households with six or 
more than six members, have aptitude to borrow more. At Endline 2, when comparison areas 
also had the same access to credit, borrowing from Spandana, other MFIs, informal and 
number of cycles borrowed are positively significant. Borrowing from banks and late 
payments are also positive but not statistically significant.    
Table 4a: Access to Credit with Household size≥6 (with Baseline Controls) 
Endline 1 
treatment    p-values hhbig      p-values treat*hhbig     p-values Obs. 
1 Spandana 0.151*** (0.019) 0.000 
0.015* 
(0.018) 0.097 
0.015 
(0.085) 0.421 6783 
2 Other MFI -0.009 (0.022) 0.678 
0.035** 
(0.014) 0.012 
0.005 
(0.018) 0.797 6630 
3 Other Bank 0.002 (0.013) 0.903 
0.019** 
(0.009) 0.046 
0.003 
(0.014) 0.807 6783 
4 Informal -0.052 (0.026) 0.049 
0.052** 
(0.017) 0.004 
0.0008 
(0.025) 0.973 6783 
5 Ever late payment? 
-0.079** 
(0.029) 0.008 
0.054** 
(0.018) 0.003 
0.030 
(0.023) 0.205 6448 
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6 
Number of 
cycles 
 borrowed 
0.137** 
(0.042) 0.001 
0.077*** 
(0.020) 0.000 
-0.038 
(0.033) 0.248 6788 
 
     
Endline 2 
treatment    p-values hhbig     p-values treat*hhbig     p-values Obs. 
1 Spandana 0.889*** (0.021) 0.000 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 0.000 
-0.012 
(0.021) 0.546 6118 
2 Other MFI -0.035 (0.030) 0.239 
0.059** 
(0.019) 0.002 
0.009 
(0.026) 0.735 6118 
3 Other Bank -0.006 (0.012) 0.612 
0.010 
(0.010) 0.032 
0.009 
(0.013) 0.496 6118 
4 Informal 0.010 (0.027) 0.714 
0.042** 
(0.021) 0.048 
-0.009 
(0.029) 0.767 6118 
5 Ever late payment? 
0.019 
(0.028) 0.508 
0.026 
(0.019) 0.175 
-0.014 
(0.028) 0.615 6118 
6 
Number of 
cycles 
 borrowed 
0.152 
(0.070) 0.032 
0.173*** 
(0.041) 0.000 
-0.026 
(0.055) 0.636 5903 
 
6.6 Credit; Households with Five or less than Five Members 
Table 4b, is constructed of two panels; Endline 1 and Endline 2. It gives the intent-to-
treat effects of easing access to credit conditioned to household size with five or less than five 
members. The access to credit is easy from Spandana in the treated areas. We are interested 
in treat*hhsmall discussion for Endline 1 here, this indicates whether smaller households are 
different when in the treatment areas. Rows 1 - 4 shows that there is a reduction in borrowing 
from Spandana, Other MFIs, Banks and informal sources. Rows 5 and 6 indicates that there is 
an increase in late repayments and the number of cycles borrowed. However, all of these 
shifts are statistically insignificant.  
At Endline 2, rows 1, 2, 5 and 6 show that there are statistically insignificant 
reductions in borrowing from Spandana and Other MFIs, and also reductions in number of 
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late repayments and borrowing cycles. Borrowing from other banks and informal sources 
have increased during this period. All of these results are statistically insignificant.  
For hhsmall discussion on its own, at Endline 1, accessing credit from Spandana, other MFIs, 
banks informal, late payments and borrowing cycles have decreased. Only the reduction in 
borrowing from informal sources, number of late repayments and borrowing cycles are 
statistically significant.  
At Endline 2, there are significant reductions in borrowing from Spandana, banks and 
borrowing cycles. There are insignificant reductions in borrowing from other MFIs, informal 
sources. However, there are increased number of repayments for this period but again 
statistically insignificant.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Access to Credit with Household size≤5 (with Baseline Controls) 
Endline 1 
treatment    p-values hhsmall   p-values treat*hhsmall  p-values Obs 
1 Spandana 0.175*** (0.027) 0.000 
-0.006 
(0.009) 0.534 
-0.024 
(0.017) 0.151 6783 
2 Other MFI 0.011 (0.030) 0.726 
-0.008 
(0.018) 0.669 
-0.030 
(0.021) 0.165 6630 
3 Other Bank 0.008 (0.014) 0.588 
-0.010 
(0.009) 0.350 
-0.007 
(0.012) 0.594 6783 
4 Informal -0.049 (0.025) 0.053 
-0.037** 
(0.017) 0.036 
-0.004 
(0.022) 0.857 6783 
5 Ever late payment? 
-0.059** 
(0.0298) 0.040 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 0.001 
0.0007 
(0.025) 0.977 6448 
6 
Number of 
cycles 
 borrowed 
0.107** 
(0.049) 0.031 
-0.070** 
(0.028) 0.014 
0.007 
(0.034) 0.846 6788 
 
     
Endline 2 
treatment   p-values hhsmall   p-values treat*hhsmall   p-values Obs 
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1 Spandana 0.082*** (0.025) 0.001 
-0.030** 
(0.014) 0.039 
-0.004 
(0.019) 0.846 6118 
2 Other MFI -0.008 (0.032) 0.807 
-0.022 
(0.020) 0.291 
-0.039 
(0.026) 0.138 6118 
3 Other Bank -0.014 (0.012) 0.253 
-0.027** 
(0.010) 0.009 
0.025 
(0.013) 0.053 6118 
4 Informal -0.009 (0.023) 0.684 
-0.027 
(0.025) 0.266 0.024 0.381 6118 
5 Ever late payment? 
0.017 
(0.025) 0.491 
0.007 
(0.021) 0.745 
-0.014 
(0.027) 0.605 6118 
6 
Number of 
cycles 
 borrowed 
0.166** 
(0.080) 0.041 
-0.094** 
(0.044) 0.036 
-0.057 
(0.060) 0.340 5903 
 
7. Conclusion 
In the previous section, this paper looked at two outcome variables; expenditure per 
capita and access to credit (borrowing) for the treated areas. The paper has carried out the 
intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis on three different sets of data. First on the treatment areas as a 
whole, then, restricted to household size with six or more than six members and lastly, 
restricted with household size with five or less than five members. In this section presents the 
findings and state whether the results were in accordance with previous studies.  
7.1 Findings on Expenditure  
Concordant with Banerjee et al’s (2014) results, this paper finds that there is a 
significant increase expenditures on durable goods for households in the treatment compared 
to comparison areas. This positive shifts occurred after the microfinance intervention see, 
Table 1. Moreover, bigger households in the treatment areas increased spending on durable 
goods, food, health and temptation goods at Endline 1. Whereas, at Endline 2, their spending 
on durable goods decreased. This reveals that these long lasting items bought had lasted till 
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the second period, therefore, households allocated less spending on this category. Spending in 
food and health remain positive and unchanged until the second period, it suggests that these 
categories are less elastic to borrowing. Bigger households expenditure decreased on non-
durable goods, education and festivals at Endline 1 however, spending on non-durable goods 
increased at Endline 2. This increase may have counterbalanced the decrease in spending on 
durable goods and temptation goods.  
At Endline 1, smaller households in the treatment areas in contrast to bigger 
households, had lower spending on durable goods, food, health and temptation goods. They 
had more spending in total and higher expenditure on non-durable goods and festivals.  
At Endline 2, smaller households in the treatment areas in contrast to bigger 
households had lower spending on food but more spending on festivals. Both had positive 
total spending however for bigger households the coefficient was three times bigger than that 
of smaller households. This is expected to happen as the number of heads per household 
increase.  
Overall, there are significant differences in the way which different household sizes 
allocate their additional resource received in the form of microcredit intervention. As stated 
above, bigger households spend more on durable goods as soon as they received a loan 
whereas smaller households do not emphasis on increasing household stocks. These results 
are revealing on how different households prioritise their expenditure categories and thus 
may serve as a guide to microcredit institutions on how to provide tailored credit packages.  
7.2 Findings on Access to Credit 
Likewise, in align with previous studies, this paper’s finding show that making access 
to credit easier led to significant amount of borrowing from Spandana. However, this was 
only small marginal percentage increases. Making access to credit easy through microcredit 
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providers did act as substitute for villagers who seek informal loans. Borrowing through 
informal sources reduced in the periods that the study was carried out.  
When looking bigger households at Endline 1, borrowing from all categories had 
increased, though statistically insignificant. Given that people felt the presence of a 
microcredit provider institution, the number of cycles borrowed relaxed. At Endline 2, this is 
two years later, as expected, it indicates that number of loan repayments increased. 
Borrowing from Spandana and informal sources decreased, this may be due to competition by 
other MFIs which had launched operating alongside Spandana.  
Comparing these results with that of smaller households in the treatment areas, at 
Endline 1, they had noticeably lower borrowing from Spandana, other MFIs, Banks and 
informal sources. This evidence provides some support to my hypothesis in this paper, that 
bigger households will borrow more. At Endline 2, smaller households, like bigger 
households had decreased borrowing from Spandana but they had reduced borrowing from 
other MFIs too. Their borrowing from banks and informal sources had increased. The reasons 
behind this contrast maybe due to unconsidered factors in this study such as family 
businesses, household preferences or loan provider criteria. Nevertheless, bigger households 
in the treatment areas have borrowed more when access to credit was made easy.  
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